Higher growth, current account surpluses, and the accumulation of foreign exchange rate reserves, together with a tough renegotiation of the foreign debt, resulting in its reduction, in an improvement in the country's external sustainability. The Central Bank played an important role in promoting the re-monetization of the economy in the aftermath of the crisis, providing liquidity for a banking sector that expanded the credit to the private sector. Further, the Central Bank provided support to the Treasury, by extending advances on fiscal revenue, and providing part of its foreign exchange reserves to pay the external commitments of the Treasury, holding bonds in exchange.
Note that the advances to the government did not imply current account deficits, and were instrumental in allowing the economy to make a relatively large recovery from the 2009 effects of the GFC. 3 It is important to emphasize that while external conditions were favorable, with the price of commodities increasing significantly, that does not mean that the economy grew as a result of good luck. In fact, inflows associated with the commodity boom put pressure on the real exchange rate and created difficulties for the process of re-industrialization, which are typical of the problems caused by the so-called Dutch Disease.
Many of the positive developments in the last decade were possible because the BCRA recovered the ability to pursue an autonomous monetary policy. The process culminated with the change of the Organic Law that regulates the actions of the BCRA, moving away from a single mandate to preserve the value of money, to the pursuit of multiple mandates associated with financial stability, employment creation, and economic development with social equity. Among the concrete measures that came from the new policy stance of the BCRA is the extension of lines of credit to productive activity, requiring that banks lend at least 5 percent of their deposits on long-term investment projects at a fixed interest rate.
In other words, the BCRA has been an integral part of an economic development strategy that prioritizes the creation of domestic jobs and the expansion of domestic markets associated with the structural transformation of the economy, while at the same time improving income distribution. This strategy has avoided the conventional wisdom obsession with inflation as the single goal of economic policy, and has steered clear of the austerity policies that have led to a slow recovery from the Global Financial Crisis in advanced economies.
In that sense, the Argentinean success since the 2001-2002 crisis underscores the relevance of dismissing the orthodox canons on how to deal with the GFC. In particular it is important, given the recent crisis in advanced economies, which owes a great deal to the worsening income distribution of the last 3 decades that led to excessive private borrowing and a financial collapse, that policies that promote inclusive strategies of development would also promote financial stability. 4 An important lesson that Argentina also highlights is the importance of better income distribution to push a healthy recovery. The rest of the introduction briefly describes the contributions to this special issue of the Review of Keynesian Economics (ROKE).
3. It is important to note that now even the International Monetary Fund suggests that fiscal austerity in the face of a recession is a mistake. See, for example, Blanchard and Leigh (2013) , who find that stronger planned fiscal adjustment in advanced economies has been associated with lower output growth. 4. On the relation between financial instability and income inequality, see Galbraith (2012) .
THE CONTRIBUTIONS IN THIS ISSUE
Gerald Epstein argues in his contribution that orthodoxy in central banking -that is, the idea that the most important priority goal for central banks would be to keep inflation in the low single digits -is, in general, neither optimal nor desirable. According to him, this orthodoxy is based on several false premises: namely, that moderate rates of inflation have high costs, that in this low-inflation environment economies naturally perform best, and, last but not least, that there are no viable alternatives to this inflationfocused monetary policy. He suggests that central banks can pursue several other goals, besides low and stable inflation rates, as the targets of their policies, including employment, real GDP growth, the rate of investment, and a stable and competitive exchange rate, since the latter might be related to employment creation and economic growth.
Arguably, in some respects, by pursuing alternative goals central banks might actually make the task of maintaining stable prices easier, since in many cases inflationary pressures arise as the result of supply side constraints associated with the inelasticity of foodstuff or energy-related commodities, and by promoting the development of productive forces in those sectors the central bank might lift the constraints. Further, Epstein argues that this is exactly what central banks have done, to a great extent, throughout history.
The three subsequent papers by Jane Knodell, William E. McColloch and Valerio Cerretano show particular historical circumstances in which unorthodox policies were essential for promoting economic development in a few developed economies, namely in the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and Italy. Knodell argues that early US central banks, the First and Second Banks of the United States, were created to provide public finance support to the Treasury, not to deal with banking instability problems. As she argues, their functions as fiscal agents for the US government were front and center in their charters, which were mute as to these banks' monetary stabilization purposes. Yet, as she demonstrates, the public finance and fiscal functions of the First and Second Banks inevitably positioned these institutions to play a regulatory role vis-à-vis the state-chartered banks and to take actions to protect and preserve the nation's stock of specie, which represented both outside money for the domestic banking system and the means for maintaining the US government's position as an international borrower.
5 Her paper highlights the importance of central banks as fiscal agents of the government and how, historically, inflation was not the main preoccupation of central banking.
McColloch contends that the adverse impact of financial regulation and state borrowing in eighteenth-century Britain, as defended by Temin and Voth (2013) , has been greatly overstated. His paper briefly outlines the historical context in which the Bubble Act emerged after the infamous South Sea Bubble, before turning to analyse the existing diversity of perspectives on the Act's lasting impact. McColloch argues that there is little evidence to support the view that the Bubble Act significantly restricted firms' access to capital, and suggests accordingly that the crowding-out argument, theoretical 5. Note that Knodell (2004) has shown that countries without central banks in the nineteenth century actually grew faster than those with established monetary authorities. In addition, according to her, the US might have had the best of both worlds, with stability provided by the Bank of England, as part of the Gold Standard global monetary system, and a certain flexibility associated with Andrew Jackson's veto of the federal rechartering of the Second Bank in July 1832.
Introduction: the role of central banks and the recent Argentinean experience 269 shortcomings aside, is largely inapplicable to eighteenth-century British economic development. Finally, McColloch argues emphatically that the savings-constrained vision of British capital markets significantly downplays the extent to which the Bank of England, founded as an institution to manage the public debt in the same vein as Knodell suggests for the US Banks, provided the entire financial system with liquidity in the eighteenth century.
It is important to note the relevance of the topic for more recent discussions about the role of financial markets in the process of development. The paper suggests that financial regulation to control speculation is perfectly compatible with a significant expansion of liquidity and higher growth associated with the structural transformation of the economy. In the case under discussion, the structural transformation would be the Industrial Revolution in Britain. But the argument is essentially true of the financial regulations imposed in the US after the Great Depression, in particular the famous Glass-Steagall Act, and the widespread use of capital controls after World War II. In the last decade the discussion on capital controls, which have been adopted in Argentina as a macro-prudential tool, which together with foreign reserve accumulation provides a buffer against financial crises without necessarily becoming a restriction to economic growth or financial development, has again become relevant.
The paper by Cerretano follows the historical approach of the previous ones, arguing that central banks in developed countries became involved with industry in the past, particularly during the inter-war period. Cerretano describes the cases of Italy and Britain where central banks provided long-term finance to ailing firms and banks, becoming important industrial players in their countries. His article explores the episode in a comparative setting, and concludes that intervention did not stem from a grand design of policy or from anti-market ideologies, but rather was piecemeal and a consequence of financial austerity. He also argues that intervention was the outcome of the over-expansion of the heavy industries more than the consequence of the weakness of financial systems. Likewise, Cerretano indicates that the Italian and British experiences also seem to point out that the direct management of ailing firms and banks proved more efficient and acceptable for central banks than the continuous provision of funds to economic groups whose managers were strangers to the central banks' bureaucracy.
The last two papers, by Juan Matías De Lucchi and by Esteban Pérez Caldentey and Matías Vernengo, move away from the more purely historical analysis of central banking and discuss the limitations of orthodox policies, in particular the currency board option adopted by Argentina in 1991, under the guise of the so-called Convertibility Plan, and the inflation-targeting approach adopted by several economies around the globe. In this sense, they complement the previous contributions by showing that current orthodox practices not only depart from the practical historical record on central banking, but also have dangerous consequences for the process of economic development.
De Lucchi shows that the explanation of the endogeneity of money during the Argentinean currency board is compatible with the heterodox endogenous money approach. The Argentinean Convertibility was interpreted in the conventional view as a pure case of the Mundell-Fleming model with fixed exchange rate (MFFER). This approach points out that domestic money supply becomes endogenous because the Central Bank loses the ability to control the monetary aggregates. In the MFFER, money endogeneity is supplyled, and results from a balance of payment effect, in other words, from the rule that says that for every dollar inflow there will be a domestic issuance, and that monetary destruction will follow outflows. The heterodox approach, on the other hand, is demand-led, resulting
